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The choice of labelling something ‘unlawful’ and ‘terrorist’ dif-
fers with place, time and party. As a researcher, it is of course 
of practical use to accept some of the essential elements of the 
phenomenon of terrorism as a starting point for academic debate. 
American terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman has stressed that 
terrorism is both a tactic and a strategy, aimed at the ‘deliberate 
creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of 
violence in the pursuit of political change’.2 These elements return 
in the academic consensus definition formulated by Alex Schmid: 
Terrorism refers on the one hand to a doctrine about the 
presumed effectiveness of a special form or tactic of fear-
generating, coercive political violence and, on the other 
hand, to a conspiratorial practice of calculated, demon-
strative, direct violent action without legal or moral re-
straints, performed for its propagandistic and psychologi-
cal effects on various audiences and conflict parties.3 
However, in practice, it is simply impossible to construct an 
all-inclusive, universally applicable definition of terrorism. 
1   This text has been extracted and modified from Beatrice de Graaf, Evaluat-
ing Counterterrorism Performance: A Comparative Study (London/New York: 
Routledge, 2011).
2   See Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1998), p. 43, and also chapter 1 as a whole.
3    A.P. Schmid, Handbook of Terrorism Research (London: Routledge, 2009).
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As Schmid, Waldmann and others have abundantly made clear, 
social impact is not something that governments can engineer 
all by themselves. On the contrary, social impact is first and 
foremost a question of media coverage. Public opinion is mostly 
influenced by the media and the gripping images of dramatic 
terrorist attacks that are disseminated through them. As Al-
theide put it: The modern ‘entertainment format, the use of 
visuals, emerging icons of fear, slogans, and especially the em-
phasis on the fear frame and “evil” provide many examples of 
how these attacks [of 9/11] contributed to the expansion of 
the discourse of fear into more attempts at social control’.8
Nacos and Torres-Reyna demonstrated that the news media’s 
portrayal of Muslims and their religion grew more negative, 
unfair and stereotypical after two years (after a remarkable 
short-lived increase in more thematical and reflective report-
ing during the immediate post 9/11 months).9 Terrorist attacks 
thus do not only contribute to fear in society at the time of the 
incident, they also – through the media – succeed in chang-
ing public attitudes for a longer period of time. In this process, 
moreover, mass media are not just mere transmitters of the 
terrorist message: ‘While the terrorists may write the script 
and perform the drama, the “theatre of terror” becomes pos-
sible only when the media provide the stage and access to a 
worldwide audience’, and select from the terrorist events the 
It is a  political affair, and therefore an ‘essentially contested 
concept’.4 Consequently, the evaluation of counterterrorism 
becomes a dubious business. For the Russians, ‘counterter-
rorism’ has an essentially different meaning than it has, for 
instance, in the European Union. With regard to the causes of 
terrorism – another crucial element in understanding how to 
counter the phenomenon – here too opinions differ greatly.
Given these essential epistemological doubts as to who or 
what can and should be labelled terrorist in a given time and 
space, it is safe enough to conclude that the act of branding 
something or someone as terrorist is an act of communica-
tion. Alex Schmid and Janny de Graaf wrote their seminal work 
on Violence as Communication in 1982, stating that terrorist 
violence should be distinguished from ordinary violence be-
cause of its communicative character.5 And terrorism expert 
Brian Jenkins argued, as early as 1975, ‘Terrorism is theatre’.6 
Peter Waldmann added to these observations with his state-
ment that most terrorists explicitly want theatre, since they 
are bent on provoking state power.7 However, counterterrorist 
reactions are a means of communication and identification as 
well, and these reactions to a large extent determine the social 
impact of terrorist actions, especially if we consider this in the 
broader socio-political context and over a longer period of time. 
4   William E. Conolly, The Terms of Political Discourse, 3rd ed. (Princeton Universi-
ty Press, 1993), p. 10; See also Alex Schmid, ‘Terrorism: The Definitional Problem’, 
Journal of International Law 36.1 (2004), pp. 375-420.
5   Alex P. Schmid and Janny de Graaf, Violence as Communication: Insurgent Ter-
rorism and the Western News Media (London: SAGE, 1982), p. 175.
6    Brian M. Jenkins, ‘International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict’, in David 
Carlton and Carlo Schaerf (eds.), International Terrorism and World Security 
(London: Croom Helm, 1975), p. 16.
7   Cf. P. Waldmann, Terrorismus: Provokation der Macht (Hamburg: Murmann 
Verlag, 2005); Richardson, What Terrorists Want (New York 2006).
8   Altheide, Creating Fear: News and the Construction of Crisis (New York: Aldine 
De Gruyter, 2002), pp. ix-x.
9   Brigitte L. Nacos and Oscar Torres-Reyna, Fuelling Our Fears: Stereotyping, 
Media Coverage, and Public Opnion of Muslim Americans (Lanham et al.: Rowman 
and Littlefield, 2007), p. 101.
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Terrorists know this even better than governments. Sig-
nificantly enough, in advance of American President Barack 
Obama’s visit to Egypt, Osama bin Laden, through Al Jazeera, 
warned the Arabic world that the United States was still de-
monising Muslims. With this message, al-Qaeda’s leader tried 
to neutralise (from his perspective) the threatening effects of 
the dialogue and cooperation that Obama offered the ‘Muslim 
World’.14 After all, with his offer, the American President under-
mined the efforts the jihadists were undertaking to mobilise 
their supporters. In this ‘influence warfare’, both the terrorists 
and Western democracies are waging a battle to convince and 
persuade the different ‘target audiences’ to rally behind them.
The concept of ‘influence warfare’ was brought to the fore only 
recently, by amongst others, James J. Forest. Ten years after 9/11, 
with two exhaustive wars going on and numerous incidents of 
Western abuses of civil liberties disclosed (keywords ‘Gitmo’ or 
‘Abu Ghraib’) it is obvious that the struggle against terrorism also 
involves the fight to shape perceptions as well.15 Not only includ-
ing the explicitly formulated strategic communications, but also 
involving the images and stories unwittingly produced through 
various counterterrorism instruments,16 like the myth connected 
with ‘Gitmo’ that the ‘West’ is waging a ‘crusade’ against Islam. 
Before governments state their own central narrative against 
such myths, as is often advocated by counterterrorist experts 
‘dramatic features of a good story’ that best resonate with 
the public, as Gabriel Weimann had already noted in 1983.10
It is however not only the media that contribute to the mak-
ing of a ‘Theater of Terror’ (Weimann), the authorities play an 
essential role as well. Governments, and their executive instru-
ments, may not be the providers of the imagery, but they can 
affect the social impact of terrorist attacks all the same.11 They 
still monopolise the use of violence and they are the ones citi-
zens turn to in times of national crises. Moreover, they often 
fuel these crises and use them to further their own political and 
military agendas.12 They amplify the ‘moral panic’ in society with 
military metaphors (‘we are at war’) or, on the contrary, exert a 
moderating influence by underlining and appealing to the social 
resilience in a society. Recall how immediately after the London 
bombings of 7 July 2005, British Prime Minister Tony Blair did 
exactly this: ‘Terror will not win, we will not be intimidated’.13
Official counterterrorism measures have a communicative effect 
that goes beyond these explicit and intended instruments. Com-
munication not only succeeds when intended: every counterter-
rorist action, even when carried out at local street level, can have 
a bearing on the ‘war of influence’ between the terrorists and the 
state. Utterances and speeches can have a profound effect as 
well, conveying to society or even the world ‘what we stand for’. 
10   Gabriel Weimann, ‘The Theater of Terror: Effects of Press Coverage’, Journal 
of Communication 33.1 (Winter 1983), pp. 38-45, at 38 and 45. 
11    Cf. F. Furedi, F., Invitation to terror: The Expanding Empire of the Unknown (New 
York/London: Continuum, 2007).
12   Cf. Altheide, Terror Post 9/11, especially chapter 7, ‘Terrorism Programming’.
13    ‘Blair says “Terror will not win”’, BBC News, 7 July 2005.
14    ‘Osama bin Laden rains on Obama’s Parade’, New York Daily News, 4 June 2009.
15   See James J.F. Forest (ed.), Influence Warfare How Terrorists and Governments 
Fight to Shape Perceptions in a War of Ideas (Westport, Conn. : Praeger Security 
International, 2009), introduction and conclusion.
16   See Walter D. Casebeer and James A. Russell, ‘Storytelling and Terrorism: 
Towards a Comprehensive “Counter-Narrative Strategy”’, Strategic Insights, 4.3 
(2005), pp. 1-16.
60 61
well. After all, the ‘warfare’ metaphor creates political urgency. 
By declaring war, even metaphorically speaking, certain public 
expectations are raised; this is accompanied by correspond-
ing drastic security measures. Consequently, the social climate 
can be subject to radical change. It is not just the terrorists who  
invoke their combatants, counterterrorism officials also help to 
shape the adversaries they combat. Counterterrorism is a form 
of communication, as is terrorism. Communicating antiterrorism 
measures involves the construction of ‘enemy’ imagery as well 
as a reproduction of the native culture’s values and principles.19 
Political scientist Lene Hansen has, as exponent of the Copenhagen 
School in Security as practice, demonstrated that security poli-
tics is to be considered a process of agenda setting and framing. 
Confirming a characteristic group identity in relation to outsiders 
and enemies is more relevant to this than genuine, physical power 
relations. When applied to counterterrorism, this means that the 
struggle against terrorism is not merely one against bombs and 
grenades, or additional laws and better security checks. More is 
at stake – preserving a nation’s ‘individuality’ in relation to ‘the 
alien’ in particular. When this is the case, i.e., when terrorism 
becomes urgent on a national level, the Copenhagen School speaks 
of a process of ‘securitisation’. This denotes that when govern-
ments succeed in depicting something or someone as a threat 
to national security, they are provided with the legitimacy and 
the possibility to employ exceptional measures – which natu-
rally does not fail to affect the group of people targeted by these 
measures. ‘Securitisation’ is therefore an intersubjective process, 
in recent years,17 the authorities should become fully aware of 
the messages they often inadvertently propagate – messages 
that could be exaggerated by terrorists and their sympathisers. 
It is this ‘performative power’ of the whole range of explicit, im-
plicit, wittingly and unwittingly initiated counterterrorism activi-
ties staged by official authorities that changes society in the long 
run, often in a much more profound fashion than the act of per-
ceived terrorism is able to achieve. Using ‘counterterrorism per-
formance’ as a guiding concept makes it possible on the one hand 
to maintain distance from the technical questions about counter-
terrorism effectiveness that are epistemologically or empirically 
almost impossible to answer. On the other, dealing with counter-
terrorism performance allows us to credit the communicative 
aspect of counterterrorism, the interrelation of terrorist actions 
and counterterrorist reactions, and the social drama or cultural 
trauma generated by them. The role of the mass media has been 
given abundant attention, as have the mechanical aspects of com-
bating terrorism. However, the role of the government in ‘market-
ing’ counterterrorism, in constructing social reality, and affecting 
the social impact of terrorism, has often been understudied.
In October 2008, American terrorism experts Kruglanski, Cren-
shaw, Post and Victoroff stated that it was time to replace the 
‘war on terror’ metaphor with a different description, since this 
image simplified the terrorism issue considerably and, rather 
than produce effective policy, fuelled resentment and rancour.18 
They argued that counterterrorism policies do not concern 
objective measures alone, but their framing and presentation as 
17    See suggestion in Anon., Transnational Terrorism, Security & the Rule of Law, 
‘Theoretical Treatise on Counterterrorism Approaches’, 19 October 2007. Deliver-
able 10, Work package 6, pp. 18, 24-25; See also National Coordinator for Coun-
terterrorism (ed.), Countering Violent Extremist Narratives (The Hague: NCTb, 
January 2010).
18   Arie Kruglanski, Martha Crenshaw, Jerrold Post and Jeff Victoroff, ‘The 
Psychology of “The War on Terror” and Other Terms for Counterterrorism’, 
Scientific American Mind, 15 October 2008, pp. 58-65. 
19    Cf. P. Norris, M. Kern and M. Just (eds.), Framing Terrorism: The News Media, 
the Government and the Public, (New York/London 2003).
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plained in Judith Butler and J.L. Austin’s discourse analysis and 
theory.23 Butler describes the performative power of ‘excit-
able speech’– like insults or hate speech – as ‘not only a ritual 
practice: it is one of the influential rituals by which subjects 
are formed and reformulated’.24 Here, performance pertains to 
communication, not only in a textual or verbal sense, but also 
in an action-oriented, act-like form of communication, as has 
been elaborate more recently by Erika Fischer-Lichte in her 
seminal work on ‘the performative turn’ in writing history.25 
Applied to counterterrorism measures this means that their 
performative power lies in the repetition, the visibility, the 
authority with which they are proclaimed and the venue of 
power attributed to them. President Bush, proclaiming a ‘War 
on Terror’ has the authority to turn that metaphor into a real-
ity; even more so, the utterance (or ‘speech act’) per se already 
is the beginning of a war, since he was supreme commander of 
the United States Armed Forces. Thus, the performative power 
of counterterrorism can be defined as the extent to which the 
national government, by means of its official counterterrorism 
policy and corresponding discourse (in statements, enactments, 
measures and ministers’ remarks) aims to mobilise public and 
political support and in the last instance, wittingly or unwittingly, 
meaning it does not concern an objective threat, but a subjective 
threat perception accepted by the majority of the population.20
This line of thinking was already introduced in 2007, as part of a 
European research project on ‘Transnational Terrorism, Security & 
the Rule of Law’. In one of the papers, the contributors identified 
five approaches to counterterrorism in the academic literature 
up to that point: the ‘Policy Perspective’, the ‘International Rela-
tions Perspective’, the ‘Hard Power versus Soft Power’ model, the 
‘Communications Perspective’ and the ‘Economic Perspective’.21 
The ‘Communications Perspective’ to the study of counterter-
rorism was attributed to, most notably, Casebeer and Russell. 
In 2005, they argued that counterterrorism officials engage in 
communicating narratives, even without being aware of them.22
Since effectiveness of short term, concrete counterterror-
ism measures is hard to assess and given the fact that the 
social impact terrorist attacks generate in the mid and long 
term is a much more fundamental issue, we can conclude that 
the way governments contribute to this impact through the 
presentation of new measures, and by communicating their 
values, norms and strategies is at least as important in ad-
dressing the terrorist question. Performance matters, not 
just the terrorist’s, but also the authorities’ performance.
‘Performance’ or ‘performative power’ is introduced and ex-
20   See Lene Hansen, Security As Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War 
(London: Routledge, 2006); See also Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and 
Powers: The Structure of International Security (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2003).
21   Transnational Terrorism, Security & the Rule of Law, ‘Theoretical Treatise on 
Counterterrorism Approaches’, 19 October 2007. Deliverable 10, Work package 6. 
22   Ibid., pp. 16-20; Casebeer and Russell, ‘Storytelling’, pp. 1-16.
23   J.L. Austin, How To Do Things with Words (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1962); Malcolm Coulthard, An Introduction to Discourse Analysis 2nd ed. 
(New York: Longman, 1985); Judith Butler, Excitable Speech: A Politics of the 
Performative (New York: Routledge, 1997).
24   Butler, Excitable Speech, p. 160. 
25   Fischer-Lichte, ‘Notwendige Ergänzung des Tekst-Modells‘, Frankfurter 
Rundschau, 23 November 1999, p. 20; Theater als Modell für eine performative 
Kultur: Zum performative turn in der europäischen Kultur des 20. Jahrhunderts 
(Universitätsreden 46), Saarbrücken 2000; Cf. also Jürgen Martschukat and 
Steffen Patzold (eds.), Geschichtswissenschaft und ‘performative turn’: Ritual, 
Inszenierung.
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this New World Summit as organised and staged by Jonas Staal, 
is how identities of terrorists and counterterrorists are be-
ing constructed and how norms and values of justice and in-
justice, of acceptable behaviour and deviance are collectively 
suggested, created, confirmed or discarded. National govern-
ments and international governments can put militant activist 
on the ‘black list’ of terrorism, thereby externalising them from 
the normal rule of law and attributing to them the category 
of ‘enemies of the state’. Purported terrorists can also present 
their story as an alternative way of justice seeking, as a strive 
for a more just society, thereby justifying their violence as 
‘counter-violence’ to perceived oppression and ‘state terror’. 
In performing or narrating these stories and identities, both 
suspected terrorists and counterterrorists tune into the expec-
tations and fears of the population and try to mobilise them by 
breaking through the ‘fourth wall’ that separates the targeted 
audience from the stage on which they are performing. The act 
of ascribed terrorism should be considered a performance in 
the category of ‘simultaneous dramaturgy’, developed by Brazil-
ian dramaturgist Augusto Boal: ‘a technique designed to involve 
spectators in a scene without requiring their physical presence 
onstage.’29 A terrorist act as performance undertakes the attempt 
to ‘demolish the wall that separates actors from spectators. 
Spectators feel that they can intervene in the action. The action 
ceases to be presented in a deterministic manner, as something 
inevitable, as Fate’.30 At the same time, this type of performance 
has a thoroughly open character, that allows both the protago-
nists and the spectators to create and (re-)write the script as 
assists the purported terrorists in creating social drama. ‘Social 
drama’ is used here in line with Robin Erica Wagner-Pacifici who 
adapted this concept to the Italian government’s handling of the 
abduction and death of statesman Aldo Moro. She, in turn, draws 
on Victor Turner and Paul Ricoeur to define ‘social drama’ as a 
moment of social transformation where society is threatened, a 
crisis is at hand, more and more protagonists are drawn in, and 
divisions already extant in society are invoked and aggravated.26
Counterterrorism measures are a way of communicating to 
the audience what society should look like, what constitutes a 
collective threat, what actions are considered legal and what is 
defined alien and hostile. Counterterrorist strategies thus are 
strategies of social control, as Crelinsten has stated as well.27 
These strategies come with costs attached. Laura K. Donohue, 
amongst others, laid the ground work for assessing the costs of 
different counterterrorist instruments. Donohue characterises 
the adoption of new powers and counterterrorist laws as a spiral 
within which special institutional interests are embedded and 
creep into the everyday (criminal) realm. This function of creep-
ing and institutional engraving of counterterrorism measures in 
a society’s fabric brings with it all kinds of political, social and 
economic costs, not in the least a loss of legitimacy, infringements 
on civil liberties, or a loss of credibility in the security domain.28 
As will become apparent through performative acts, such as 
26   Robin Erica Wagner-Pacifici, The Moro Morality Play: Terrorism as Social 
Drama (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1986), pp. 8-9. 
She quotes: Paul Ricoeur, ‘The Model of the Text: Social Action considered as a 
Text’,  New Literary History 5 (1973), pp. 91-117; Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, vol. 1 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984); Victor Turner, ‘Social Dramas 
and Stories about Them’, Critical Inquiry (Autumn 1980), pp. 141-168.
27   Crelinsten, Counterterrorism, p. 219.
28   Laura K. Donohue, The Cost of Counterterrorism. Power, Politics, and Liberty 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 24.
29   Cf. Elizabeth Bell, Theories of Performance, p. 208.
30   Augusto Boal, Theatre of the Oppressed (New York: Theatre Communications 
Group, 1985), p. 134.
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it unfolds. This model of performance helps us to discuss the 
question whether and to what extent the interplay of terrorist 
attacks, purported preparations or perceived radicalisation on 
the one hand and the public, media and political reactions there-
upon on the other, and embedded within the historical context of 
socio-cultural configurations and collective action repertoires, 
succeeds in breaking up traditions, undermine social norms and 
values and helps to bring about new ideas of justice and injustice. 
In rehearsing these stories and playing out identities of activ-
ism, state responses and collective indignation, in a performa-
tive act such as this New World Summit, we can contribute 
to the critical debate on (counter)terrorism, identify the 
different strategies that are acted out, and expose the po-
litical struggle that lies behind the framing and defining of 
someone or something as terrorism. In this sense, we will 
be able to unpack and overcome the – often – too simple di-
chotomy of terrorism and counterterrorism, and try to reflect 
on our own role as ‘spect-actors’ to the theatre of terror. 
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